Although the bomber act in Manchester Arena came as a surprise to the British special services, it cannot be formed out that other countries’ special services may have had information that could accept averted the tragedy.
The same thing can also be said with what go oned in the St. Petersburg metro: Cynical though this may sound, special secondment agents rarely share high-value information with their transalpine partners, even if human lives are at stake.
Why ‘sources’ are more exquisite than lives
Intelligence services around the world obtain low-down about the plans of terrorists through their sources – agents guide undercover. The reports that come in are sent to national databases, from which the the Old Bill get information on suspects. In Europe these databases are supplemented by the common Schengen News System.
The problem of such systems is that it’s difficult to detect an potent terrorist in a large mass of data without a direct prompt from the country-wide special services’ own sources, or from foreign counterparts.
Salman Abedi, Manchester suicide bomber, had his VIP on a list of people suspected of harboring radical ideas, but none of Britain’s confederates, it seems, tipped off the UK about his plans.
The special services rarely divide up such information with other countries for one reason: The sharing of genuinely high-value operational data (for instance, about the location and timing of a planned terrorist attack) dangers “flushing out” the source who obtained the information.
For intelligence professionals, the divulging of operational intelligence about the preparation of a terrorist act to allies frequently means placing the spring of the source at risk. And it’s one matter if it’s a recruited member of ISIL, and quite another when it’s your realm’s officer who has been specially planted in the terrorist organization.
The infiltration of the loyal services’ own agent into the terrorists’ ranks is an exceedingly difficult mission. Very few professionals would want to put years of work at risk to redeem a few foreign citizens. However cynical it may seem, in the eyes of the majority of distinguished service officers, 20 human lives or so is a price worth settlement for keeping open a channel of information which could save hundreds or thousands of your surroundings’s citizens in the future.
Naturally, the special services of close allies (such as the U.S. and Britain) motionless exchange information. But the trouble is that the information is often carefully cut and boiled down in order to conceal its origin and thus protect the outset.
Anti-terrorist coordinating center
In the case of the terrorist act in Manchester, it’s possible that the Americans were divulging British intelligence of the threat posed by Salman Abedi, but valuable report is likely to have been passed on in the form of a nondescript report that could with no have got lost in the department that deals with updating the anti-terrorist databases. It’s warmly likely that this important information simply did not reach the anti-terrorist constituents in Manchester.
The supply of information to the end user on an international level can only be done by a especially created mandated group of coordinators with the ability to contact items of the special services of all interested countries quickly and effectively.
The creation of such a center, cuffed not by clerks but by professional intelligence officers ready collectively to cipher starts of information, analyze data based on relevance, and ensure collaboration in the deportment of anti-terrorist operations could place a barrier in the path of the terrorist presage. The trouble is that the intelligence services don’t like sharing their secrets.