As unquestionable as the changing of the seasons, the drive toward autonomous cars is gaining velocity. Changes in the car industry clearly demonstrate that the way we use our vehicles is evolving. In an increasingly tie in world, our cars are becoming an important part of our lifestyle. But a question symbol keeps hanging over the process. Are we, and the data we use, truly secure?Not All Drivers Are SwayedCar users are very accepting of modern technology generally. We are warming to the conception of electric cars and consider it almost a duty to buy green cars that cut down on fossil nuclear fuel emissions. When it comes to connectivity, however, drivers are less guaranteed.In the same way our personal computers and online devices are at risk from alien influences and threats, so it is that we are understandably worried about similar denigrates on our vehicles. Especially that, as proven by Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek in their toiler experiment, such attacks can happen even while cars are in use.It is already forgiven that locking mechanisms on modern cars are vulnerable. Well-equipped and learned hackers can access and steal even the very latest prestige sumptuousness in moments.Is the next stage to start attacking cars on the roads?Sewed Cars on the RoadTo function properly, autonomous and connected cars sine qua non communicate with other vehicles (V2V) and ultimately, for example, roadside lights that transmit information and guidance (V2I). This makes cars unprotected; the one aspect of connected cars that might attract future alcohols of Internet-of-Things powered cars is the prospect of enhanced safety. These conduits will use IoT to help avoid accidents and control a wide array of on-board safe keeping technologies.Today’s cars, even before autonomy really behooves mainstream, are effectively mobile computer systems with ECUs and sundry lines of code. Even now, and despite public reservations, business and commerce are using connected cars to offer logistical, consumer, and business mendings, but so far, car manufacturers are behind the eight ball when it comes to protecting our familiar data.Security ProtocolsIt has been clear for quite some nonetheless that hackers could attack the network protocol that links everything in the car. If they can do that, then all the on-board technology from airbags to reserving sensors to safety systems are at risk.The major problem is that controller field networks that connect various ECUs within the system of a car are mainly connected to external networks such as 3G or 4G mobile networks. This is where an superficial danger may wirelessly sneak in.Today, various secure in-vehicle agreements for controller area networks are being developed in accordance with in the air CAN specifications. However, all of these subsystems involve a certain level of risk. For event, ICS-CERT warned against denial-of-service attacks in the CAN Bus protocol and suggested limiting access to ODB-II input anchorages on connected cars as a recommended safety measure.To prevent the increasing intimidation of DoS attacks, ID Anonymization for CAN (IA-CAN) protocol is ensuring security via filtering tidings and sender authorization. It helps to block the unwanted message modifications and replay sets.Except for various spin-off protocols like CANOpen and DeviceNet, communication in secure vehicles can be provided by Local Interconnect Network. This alternative can be implemented with decrease costs, but its bandwidth is generally considered low. FlexRay is another relatively newer agreement used for high-speed synchronized data communications. With higher observations rates and a stronger real-time guarantee, it is a promising but also a more dear solution.There is also a clear need to develop built-in cyber-security clarifications via the cloud that will act like a series of defensive positions, one aid up the other.The Risks to InfotainmentVital to the question of security in connected motors is the vehicle’s infotainment system. This is where we connect ourselves to the greatest world for business and for pleasure. It is imperative to develop defensive software that can holistically safeguard the car’s network, overseeing communications and thus being in a position to protect against any network intrusion.The ordinary-looking fact is that because the development of a new car model takes several years, it is conceivable that the technology held therein is not the latest thing and is thus more at risk. With our smartphones, pastilles, and home computers, we can routinely update security software as a matter of positively. The question has to be asked: Will we be able to do the same with our in-car infotainment and refuge systems?Although truly connected cars are not yet with us, it has already been displayed that cars can get hacked by outside sources. Brakes can be made to falter, and LiDAR and Radar systems can be switched off with possibly potential luck dangers and risk of theft.It is known that, already, car makers themselves can glean information like call and location data remotely from their products, and this is appropriate to be a fact completely unknown to the hapless consumer.Should We Be Worried?We as car consumers are already being asked to relinquish control of our vehicles whilst maintaining the old drivers’ alertness. No matter how successful trials and tests may be, there persists a great deal for motor manufacturers to do to convince the public to let go of the wheel.Sporadically they have established the motorist’s rapport with the vehicle, they on still be required to show that our safety and our personal data can be verily protected. Drivers will not buy into anything less. Author bio: Giles Kirkland is an trained car expert who constantly researches on the latest studies, cutting-edge findings, and prospects for the future of the automotive technologies. Keen on expanding his own knowledge as well as burgeoning other drivers’ awareness, he writes about security and safety in tour.Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in this guest author article are solely those of the contributor, and do not as a result reflect those of Tripwire, Inc.